More Advanced Signaling Games

Felix Munoz-Garcia and Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
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Daniel Toro-Gonzalez: Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Daniel Toro González ()

Chapter Chapter 11 in Strategy and Game Theory, 2019, pp 487-526 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The final chapter presents extensions and variations of signaling games, thus providing more practice about how to find the set of PBEs in incomplete information settings. We first study a poker game where, rather than having only one player being privately informed about his cards (as in Chap. 8 ), both players are privately informed. In this context, the first mover’s actions can reveal information about his cards to the second mover, thus affecting the latter’s incentives to bet or fold relative to a context of complete information.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-11902-7_11

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