Sequential-Move Games with Complete Information

Felix Munoz-Garcia and Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
Additional contact information
Daniel Toro-Gonzalez: Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Daniel Toro González ()

Chapter Chapter 4 in Strategy and Game Theory, 2019, pp 155-217 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter we explore sequential-move games in which players observe all relevant information, and describe how to solve these games by using backward induction, which yields the set of Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). Intuitively, every player anticipates the optimal actions that players acting in subsequent stages will select, and chooses his actions in the current stage accordingly.

Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Chapter: Sequential-Move Games with Complete Information (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-11902-7_4

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783030119027

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-11902-7_4

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Texts in Business and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().