Repeated Games and Correlated Equilibria

Felix Munoz-Garcia and Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
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Daniel Toro-Gonzalez: Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Daniel Toro González ()

Chapter Chapter 6 in Strategy and Game Theory, 2019, pp 277-321 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract InRepeated games this chapter we explore agents’ incentives to cooperate when they interact in infinite repetitions of a stage game, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma game or the Cournot oligopolyOligopoly game. Repeated interactions between the same group of individuals, or repeated competition between the same group of firms in a given industry, are fairly common.

Date: 2019
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Chapter: Repeated Games and Correlated Equilibria (2016)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-11902-7_6

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