Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signaling Games

Felix Munoz-Garcia and Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
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Daniel Toro-Gonzalez: Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Daniel Toro González ()

Chapter Chapter 9 in Strategy and Game Theory, 2019, pp 381-457 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter examines again contexts of incomplete information but in sequential move games. Unlike simultaneous-move settings, sequential moves allow for players’ actions to convey or conceal the information they privately observe to players acting in subsequent stages and who did not have access to such information (uninformed players). That is, we explore the possibility that players’ actions may signal certain information to other players acting latter on in the game.

Date: 2019
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Chapter: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signaling Games (2016)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-11902-7_9

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