Environmental Externalities and Their Internalization Through Voluntary Approaches

Wolfgang Buchholz () and Dirk Rübbelke

Chapter 2 in Foundations of Environmental Economics, 2019, pp 13-36 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter it is explained how the optimal pollution level can be determined in an elementary model in which the emissions of a single polluter harm a single “victim.” In particular, it is shown how this optimal outcome might in principle be accomplished by bargaining between the polluter and the victim, but there are many obstacles preventing the success of such Coasean bargaining. The chapter also discusses other voluntary approaches for the internalization of environmental externalities, especially for the case of multilateral externalities where several polluters harm each other.

Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-16268-9_2

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-16268-9_2

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