Institutions and Monetary Policy

Hubert Kempf
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Hubert Kempf: École Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay

Chapter 4 in Monetary Unions, 2022, pp 121-163 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter is devoted to the monetary institutional design of a monetary union. The argument that a monetary union allows an incoming country to import credibility is discussed. Centred on the inflation bias issue, it shows that the results obtained in a simple economy do not apply straightforwardly in a monetary union. Delegating monetary policy to an independent central banker does not necessarily reduce the inflation bias as the nomination procedures based on bargaining introduce new strategic channels. The issues of nomination of a monetary policy committee, accountability and transparency are also addressed in this chapter.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-93232-9_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-93232-9_4

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