Environmental Externalities and their Internalization Through Voluntary Approaches

Wolfgang Buchholz, Christiane Reif and Dirk Rübbelke
Additional contact information
Wolfgang Buchholz: University of Regensburg
Christiane Reif: Landshut University of Applied Sciences
Dirk Rübbelke: TU Bergakademie Freiberg

Chapter Chapter 2 in Foundations of Environmental Economics, 2024, pp 23-47 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapterEnvironmental externality explainsInternalization how, in principle, the optimal level of pollution could be achieved by bargainingBargaining between the polluter and the victim. It is also explicated that there are many obstacles to the success of such Coasean bargainingCoasean bargaining. The chapter also discusses other voluntary approaches to internalizing environmental externalitiesEnvironmental externality, including in the case of multilateral externalitiesMultilateral externality where multiple polluters harm each other.

Keywords: Coasean bargaining; Property rights; Transaction costs; Asymmetric information; Fairness consideration; Matching; Social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-031-63481-9_2

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783031634819

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-63481-9_2

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Texts in Business and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().