The Revenue Equivalence Principle

Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia
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Pak-Sing Choi: National Central University
Felix Munoz-Garcia: Washington State University

Chapter 6 in Auction Theory, 2025, pp 231-252 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter, we evaluate the seller’s expected revenue in different auction formats and show under which contexts this revenue is equivalent. First, Exercise 6.1 considers the first-price, second-price, third-price, and all-pay auctions from the previous chapters, evaluating the expected revenue that each of them generate, and showing that the expected revenue coincides.

Keywords: Revenue equivalence theorem; Risk-averse bidders; Risk-averse seller; Risk-neutral seller; Second-order stochastic dominance; Misreporting; Revelation principle; Myerson’s characterization theorem; Linear utility functions; Expected transfer; Asymmetric probability distributions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-93271-7_6

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