Assigning Multiple Homogeneous Items in a Single Auction

Asunción Mochón and Yago Sáez
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Asunción Mochón: UNED University
Yago Sáez: University Carlos III of Madrid

Chapter 4 in Understanding Auctions, 2015, pp 35-58 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In previous chapters, the main single-unit auction models were discussed. However, in many instances auctions are used to award multiple related units. For example, if an olive oil factory wants to sell part of its stock, it can choose to conduct an auction. The items to be auctioned may be homogeneous (oil bottles of the same size and acidity) or heterogeneous (different sizes and acidities) and may be awarded in a single auction or in different auctions.

Keywords: Aggregate Demand; Identical Item; Winning Bidder; Vickrey Auction; Auction Model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-08813-6_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-08813-6_4

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