Double Auctions

Asunción Mochón and Yago Sáez
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Asunción Mochón: UNED University
Yago Sáez: University Carlos III of Madrid

Chapter 6 in Understanding Auctions, 2015, pp 73-85 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In the auctions analyzed to this point, we have assumed that there is only one seller and many bidders, in which the seller acts as a monopolist (forward auction). However, the main characteristic of a double auction is that multiple buyers and sellers interact; it is a two-sided auction.

Keywords: Price Rule; Aggregate Supply; Open Price; Double Auction; Total Payment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-08813-6_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-08813-6_6

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