Introduction to Combinatorial Auctions

Asunción Mochón and Yago Sáez
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Asunción Mochón: UNED University
Yago Sáez: University Carlos III of Madrid

Chapter 7 in Understanding Auctions, 2015, pp 87-103 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter, we introduce the concept of combinatorial auction (CA), or package auction. In this model, the seller offers multiple items (usually heterogeneous but related) in a single auction, in which the bidders are allowed to bid for the items or combinations of items that they want. These auctions are particularly suitable when substitutes and complements items are auctioned, because the risk of aggregation or exposure is reduced.

Keywords: Efficient Allocation; Core Outcome; Bidding Strategy; Combinatorial Auction; Price Rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-08813-6_7

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-08813-6_7

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