Auctions

Günter Knieps
Additional contact information
Günter Knieps: University of Freiburg

Chapter 5 in Network Economics, 2015, pp 87-99 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract An auction is a market mechanism which, by means of explicit rules, transfers market players' bids into an allocation of resources. An auction yields an unequivocal result as to which market player gets a specific object at which price. In network sectors auctions have considerable potential as allocation mechanisms for network services (e.g. providing bus services) and for the provision of network infrastructure capacities (e.g. take-off and landing slots on airports). In this context, auctions of public resources, for instance radio frequencies, on the basis of which network infrastructures can be built, are the best known examples. This chapter analyses the network-specific particularities of auctions in network industries.

Keywords: Allocation Mechanism; Combinatorial Auction; English Auction; Auction Theory; Vickrey Auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-11695-2_5

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319116952

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-11695-2_5

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Texts in Business and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().