Set Valued Functions: Equilibria—Games

Wolfgang Eichhorn and Winfried Gleißner
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Wolfgang Eichhorn: Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
Winfried Gleißner: University of Applied Sciences Landshut

Chapter 9 in Mathematics and Methodology for Economics, 2016, pp 477-507 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract It starts introducing as set valued functions production correspondences which must fulfil Shephard’s axioms. Competitive equilibria are discussed and Kakutani’s fixed point theorem is proven. The chapter ends with an application of this theorem in the theory of games. It investigates the existence and uniqueness of Nash (repelling) equilibria.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Economic Agent; Exchange Economy; Competitive Equilibrium; Profit Function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-23353-6_9

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