Mixed Strategies, Strictly Competitive Games, and Correlated Equilibria

Felix Munoz-Garcia and Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
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Daniel Toro-Gonzalez: Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Daniel Toro González ()

Chapter Chapter 3 in Strategy and Game Theory, 2016, pp 61-106 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract ThisStrictly competitive game chapter analyzes how to find equilibrium behavior when players are allowed to randomize, helping us to identify mixed strategyMixed strategy Nash equilibria (msNE). Finding this type of equilibrium completes our analysis in Chap. 2 where we focused on Nash equilibria involving pure strategiesPure strategies (not allowing for randomizations).

Date: 2016
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Chapter: Mixed Strategies, Strictly Competitive Games, and Correlated Equilibria (2019)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-32963-5_3

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