Politics and Corruption in the Two-Period Model

Maksym Ivanyna, Alex Mourmouras and Peter Rangazas
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Maksym Ivanyna: Joint Vienna Institute

Chapter 3 in The Macroeconomics of Corruption, 2018, pp 73-109 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In the attempt to better explain economic policies, this chapter introduces selfish motives on the part of policy makers. While they may have one eye on the national interest, as in Chap. 2 , the other eye is fixed on individual gains such as being re-elected or increasing personal income. Our main purpose is to highlight the ways that politics and selfish motives distort fiscal policy and lower national welfare.

Keywords: Interest Groupsinterest Groups; Corruption Tax; polarizationPolarization; Government Budget Constraint; Poor Regions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Chapter: Politics and Corruption in the Two-Period Model (2021)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-68666-0_3

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