The Contracts in the Tourism Markets

Guido Candela and Paolo Figini
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Guido Candela: University of Bologna

Chapter Chapter 11 in The Economics of Tourism Destinations, 2012, pp 355-398 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract After having studied the economic problem of tourism firms (Chaps. 8 and 9) as well as their strategic choice in terms of product differentiation, mechanisms of signaling, reputation, advertising, etc. (Chap. 10), in this chapter we will address a number of issues arising from the transactions between firms operating in different markets. In fact, the existence of uncertainty about the future, information asymmetry, and the subsequent opportunistic behavior, the specific features of investment projects, all require the arrangement of tailor-made contracts between firms aimed at bringing back efficiency in the transaction.

Keywords: Tour Operator; Expected Profit; Opportunistic Behavior; Insurance Contract; Tourism Destination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-642-20874-4_11

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-20874-4_11

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