Appendix to Chapter 12

Giancarlo Gandolfo

Chapter Chapter 26 in International Trade Theory and Policy, 2014, pp 547-550 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We examine here a model by Brock, Magee, and Young (1989, Appendix to chap. 3), which considers two lobbies and two parties. Lobby 1 is pro-export (i.e., it favours an export subsidy that is to say a negative tariff). Lobby 2 is protectionist, namely in favour of a tariff on imports. Party 1 is pro-export, while party 2 is protectionist. The bulk of the voters are in favour of free trade but are imperfectly informed and behave in a nonstrategic manner.

Keywords: Marginal Cost; Free Trade; Demand Curve; Unfavourable Effect; Marginal Revenue (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-642-37314-5_26

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-37314-5_26

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