Cooperative Game Theory

Edith Elkind and Jörg Rothe
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Edith Elkind: University of Oxford
Jörg Rothe: Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf

Chapter Chapter 3 in Economics and Computation, 2016, pp 135-193 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter provides an introduction to cooperative game theory, which complements noncooperative game theory (Chapter 2 ). Both of these fields study strategic aspects of cooperation and competition among the players. In noncooperative game theory, players are assumed to choose their actions individually, selfishly seeking to realize their own goals and to maximize their own profit. While this does not mean that players are necessarily adversarial to other players (for example, they may prefer the dove strategy over the hawk strategy in the chicken game), they are not interested in other players’ welfare.

Keywords: Cooperative Game; Coalition Structure; Simple Game; Grand Coalition; Winning Coalition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-47904-9_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-47904-9_3

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