Judgment Aggregation

Dorothea Baumeister, Gábor Erdélyi and Jörg Rothe
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Dorothea Baumeister: Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf
Gábor Erdélyi: University of Siegen
Jörg Rothe: Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf

Chapter Chapter 6 in Economics and Computation, 2016, pp 361-391 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In Chapters 4 and 5 , we were concerned with making collective decisions by voting, i.e., with methods for how to aggregate the voters’ individual preferences so as to determine the winning alternative(s) as a collective consensus. In the present chapter, we turn to the closely related topic of judgment aggregation, i.e., to methods for how to aggregate the individual judgments of a number of judges so as to determine the joint judgment(s) as a collective consensus.

Keywords: Majority Rule; Median Property; Individual Judgment; Judgment Aggregation; Shoot Range (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-47904-9_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-47904-9_6

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