 Theoretical Concepts for the Assessment of Managed CareVolker Eric Amelung
Chapter 3 in Healthcare Management, 2019, pp 27-42 from Springer Abstract: Abstract The following section is particularly directed at readers who are interested in theory. Using the two main approaches of the new institutional economics (Schauenberg et al. 2005; Coase 1988, 1993; Demsetz 1967, 1968, 1988; North 1991; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Hart and Moore 1990; Furubotn and Pejovich 1974; Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Sloan 1988), certain fundamental ideas will be introduced about the design of institutions as well as incentive and monitoring systems. The transaction cost theory (Williamson 1975, 1985, 1986, 1993; Windsperger 1996) offers a method for analysing the assessment of vertical integration along the value chain and, thus, for evaluating integrated care systems, among other things. The principal-agent theory (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985; Pauly 1968; Mooney 1993; Akerlof 1970; Arrow 1963) is concentrated on delegation relations and their inherent information asymmetries. There is hardly another field in which the considerable information asymmetries are so clear between those who delegate tasks (e.g. the patient) and those who carry out the tasks (e.g. a physician). The principal-agent theory investigates how contracts can best be designed in such a configuration. Date: 2019 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-59568-8_3 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-59568-8_3 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Springer Texts in Business and Economics from Springer |
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