The Theory of Public Goods

Toshihiro Ihori
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Toshihiro Ihori: National Gradual Institute for Policy Studies

Chapter 11 in Principles of Public Finance, 2017, pp 295-327 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In Chap. 8 , we investigated taxation from the viewpoint of efficiency. In this chapter, we investigate government spending from the viewpoint of efficiency. Here, the notion of public goods is important. As explained in Chap. 1 , public goods have properties of non-rivalness and non-excludability. Non-rivalness in consumption means that an increase in someone’s consumption does not reduce the availability of consumption for others. Non-excludability means that someone cannot be excluded from consuming a good because of technical or other reasons simply because she or he does not pay the price.

Keywords: Public goods; Non-rivalness; Non-excludability; Pure public goods; Impure public goods; Club goods; commons; Samuelson rule; Nash equilibrium approach; Private provision of public goods; Lindahl equilibrium; Person-specific burden ratio; Free rider problem; Clarke tax; Neutrality theorem of public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-981-10-2389-7_11

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-10-2389-7_11

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