Cooperative Games

Susheng Wang ()
Additional contact information
Susheng Wang: Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Chapter Chapter 9 in Microeconomic Theory, 2018, pp 299-316 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract For a group of players, it is possible that they cooperate in some way to improve their individual welfare. They may find a need for cooperation on a common objective, but they may bargain over the sharing of benefits, just like the OPEC. They may form coalitions to cooperate within a coalition but compete between coalitions, just like political parties in practice. They may also seek third-party coordination, such as arbitration and government social programs.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-981-13-0041-7_9

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9789811300417

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-13-0041-7_9

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Texts in Business and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().