Asymmetric Information

Rohit Prasad ()
Additional contact information
Rohit Prasad: Management Development Institute Gurugaon, Economics and Public Policy

Chapter 5 in A Case-Based Approach to Game Theory, 2026, pp 135-195 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter investigates situations where different players possess different levels of information, leading to strategic behaviour like brinkmanship, bluffing, and signalling. Beginning with the theory of hardball tactics, it analyses how information asymmetry influences high-stakes geopolitical games—such as US–North Korea relations, Indo-Pakistani conflicts, and the war in Ukraine. The concept of pseudo-brinkmanship is introduced to describe a situation in which one of the players secretly prefers the situation of mutual destruction to compromise. The second half of the chapter explores signalling games, including the well-known Beer–Quiche game, and applies them to political, bureaucratic, and educational settings. The chapter demonstrates that strategic communication under uncertainty is both pervasive and perilous, requiring nuanced understanding of belief systems and credibility.

Date: 2026
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-981-95-4302-1_5

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9789819543021

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-95-4302-1_5

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Texts in Business and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().