Games in Normal Form

R. K. Amit ()
Additional contact information
R. K. Amit: Indian Institute of Technology Madras

Chapter Chapter 3 in Game Theory with Applications in Operations Management, 2024, pp 21-55 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Chapters 1 and 2 provided the background for the remainder of this book. In this chapter, we consider normal-form games, a representation of noncooperative games, to model strategic situations when the players move simultaneously. We study different solution concepts for such a class of games and discuss their existence and computation. We begin this chapter with some examples. This is one of the most commonly used examples to illustrate basic ideas of game theory. In the prisoner’s dilemma, two prisoners are being convicted for a crime. Lacking credible evidence, the authorities question the prisoners independently to know whether they committed the crime. No preplay communication is allowed. Each prisoner has two possible actions: $$\{C,D\}$$ { C , D } —confess the crime (C) and do not confess (D). This is also a bimatrix game, and the payoff matrix is shown in Fig. 3.1.

Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-981-99-4833-8_3

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9789819948338

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-99-4833-8_3

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Texts in Business and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().