Concluding Discussion

Andranik Tangian
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Andranik Tangian: Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

Chapter Chapter 11 in Analytical Theory of Democracy, 2020, pp 499-508 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We discuss the major points that distinguish this study from some others on the same topic. In the domain of collective decision making, the aim is at computable optimal compromises as opposed to axiom consistency analysis in social choice. As for political philosophy, the focus is made on public determination in the sense of the Rousseauvian general will referred to by Borda and Condorcet, as opposed to the individual determination considered in public choice and mathematical economics. To enhance policy representation, we propose the Third Vote election method, which bridges direct and representative democracies. Finally, we explain how the operationalized notion of representativeness can be used in both societal and non-societal applications.

Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-030-39691-6_11

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-39691-6_11

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