Liability Situations with Successive Tortfeasors

Frank Huettner () and Dominik Karos ()
Additional contact information
Frank Huettner: Sungkyunkwan University
Dominik Karos: Center for Mathematical Economics

A chapter in Advances in Collective Decision Making, 2023, pp 191-204 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Given a tort that involves several tortfeasors, an allocation scheme attributes to each of them that part of the damage that reflects their responsibility. We consider successive torts—i.e., torts that involve a causality chain—and show that simple and intuitive principles, which are well-known in the law of tort, uniquely define an allocation scheme. We show that this scheme incentivizes agents to exhibit a certain level of care, creating an efficient prevention of accidents. We further describe the unique rule according to which a liability situation has to be adjusted after a partial settlement such that incentives to settle early are created.

Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-031-21696-1_12

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783031216961

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_12

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Studies in Choice and Welfare from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().