The Power of Closeness in a Network

Manfred J. Holler () and Florian Rupp ()
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Manfred J. Holler: University of Hamburg, Germany and CCR-Munich
Florian Rupp: Kutaisi International University, Georgia and CCR-Munich

A chapter in Advances in Collective Decision Making, 2023, pp 243-258 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper considers the question of whether it is profitable for a weaker player to be closely linked to a strong/powerful player—our conjecture is ‘Yes’—and whether it is more beneficial to a strong/powerful player to be closely linked with a weak player than being linked with a strong player. Our understanding of power is based on the Public Good Index. We will demonstrate that in this sense power is a non-local concept indicating that strong players form a ‘hot-region’ about the strongest player. To obtain this result, we present an easy to perform algorithm for the computer-based determination of the Public Good Index on networks that equips us with instruments for studying the voting power in small networks.

Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-031-21696-1_15

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_15

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