Codecision in Context Revisited: The Implications of Brexit

Nicola Maaser () and Alexander Mayer ()
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Nicola Maaser: Aarhus University
Alexander Mayer: Department of Economics, University of Bayreuth

A chapter in Advances in Collective Decision Making, 2023, pp 321-334 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The paper analyzes the implications of the UK’s leave from the European Union for the distribution of power between the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament and within the Council under the EU’s codecision procedure. Unlike previous studies on this issue, we do not treat the Council in isolation but follow the richer framework of Maaser & Mayer (2016). That is, we model the codecision procedure as a bargaining game between the European Parliament and the Council under various a priori preference assumptions. We find that the withdrawal of the UK has no significant effect on the power distribution between the European Parliament and the Council and that it is mainly the large member states that benefit from the UK’s leave.

Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-031-21696-1_19

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_19

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