Banzhaf–Coleman and Shapley–Shubik Indices in Games with a Coalition Structure: A Special Case Study

Maria Ekes ()
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Maria Ekes: Warsaw School of Economics

A chapter in Voting Power and Procedures, 2014, pp 221-246 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In the paper we deal with the comparison of the Shapley–Shubik index and Banzhaf–Coleman index in games with a coalition structure. We analyze two possible approaches in both cases: we calculate voters’ power in a composite game or we apply the modification of original indices proposed by Owen for games with a priori unions. The behavior of both indices is compared basing on the voting game with 100 voters and different coalition structures. We analyze changes of power (measured by means of BC index and SS index) implied by changes of the size and composition of coalition structures as well as by different methodology of measuring the voters’ power (composite game versus game with a priori unions).

Keywords: Vote Rule; Coalition Structure; Party Member; Vote Game; Individual Voter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-05158-1_13

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-05158-1_13

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