On the Possibility of a Preference-Based Power Index: The Strategic Power Index Revisited

Dieter Schmidtchen () and Bernard Steunenberg
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Dieter Schmidtchen: University of the Saarland

A chapter in Voting Power and Procedures, 2014, pp 259-286 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we discuss the strategic power index (SPI) as we have developed in earlier work. In contrast to traditional power indices, which deduce power from voting rules for a set of players, the SPI employs the analytical tools of non-cooperative game theory. Actor preferences, the policy space, decision-making rules, as well as the strategic considerations of the players in playing games, are integrated into the analysis. While traditional power indices calculate the probability of a voter being decisive in a committee, the SPI measures average (expected) success. In view of various objections made against the SPI, we show that this index expresses power in a meaningful way. We argue against the idea that SPI as preference-based index is impossible since it does not capture ‘a fixed core of meaning of power’. We challenge the view that the index confounds power and success, and even can become negative. Finally, we discuss the proposition that the SPI is a modified Banzhaf index, and show that this proposition is based on a too simple representation of a strategic game.

Keywords: Ideal Point; Power Index; Equilibrium Outcome; Game Form; Agenda Setter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-05158-1_15

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-05158-1_15

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