Postulates and Paradoxes of Voting Power in a Noncooperative Setting

Maria Montero

A chapter in Voting Power and Procedures, 2014, pp 309-321 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper discusses whether the equilibrium of a popular formal bargaining model due to (Baron & Ferejohn, 1989, American Political Science Review, 83, 1181–1206) satisfies the postulates that (Felsenthal & Machover, 1998, The measurement of voting power: theory and practice, problems and paradoxes. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar) consider essential in any power measure. It is well known that the equilibrium does not satisfy two adequacy postulates, namely ignoring dummies and vanishing only for dummies. This paper shows that it does not respect dominance either. It is also argued that the equilibrium displays one of the less intuitive instances of the paradox of new members.

Keywords: Simple Game; Grand Coalition; Bargaining Game; Vote Power; Winning Coalition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-05158-1_17

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-05158-1_17

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