Voting Power Techniques: What Do They Measure?

Sreejith Das ()
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Sreejith Das: University of London

A chapter in Voting Power and Procedures, 2014, pp 65-95 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Voting power science is a field of co-operative game theory concerned with calculating the influence a voter can exert on the outcome of a voting game. The techniques used to calculate voting power have names like the Shapley-Shubik index, and the Banzhaf measure. They are invaluable when used to design democratically fair voting games. In this paper we examine these different techniques, with the specific aim of trying to understand what they are measuring. Many commentators have argued that the techniques are similar, albeit with different probability models. But by focusing upon the less well know differences that exist in the underlying measures themselves, it soon becomes apparent that the dissimilarities between the techniques extend far beyond their methods of counting voting coalitions.

Keywords: Voting Power; Banzhaf Measure; Shapley-Shubik Index; Total Criticality; Minimal Winning Coalitions (MWC) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-05158-1_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-05158-1_5

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