Pluralism and Majority Decision

Eerik Lagerspetz
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Eerik Lagerspetz: University of Turku

Chapter Chapter 6 in Social Choice and Democratic Values, 2016, pp 341-382 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The post-war pluralist theories of democracy argue that modern democracies are characterized by switching majority coalitions and negotiated compromises. Pluralist arrangements increase stability because they provide reasons for minorities to participate in democratic politics, and make the traditional problem of “majority tyranny” less relevant. The Rikerian “instability” of decisions may actually be a source of political stability. First, some less-known predecessors of pluralism (Benjamin Constant and Hans Kelsen) are discussed. Two less-known “paradoxes” of social choice, the Ostrogorski Paradox and the Anscombe Paradox, are introduced. It is shown how these problems are related to two traditional problems of political theory and of institutional design: the choice between direct and indirect forms of democracy and the choice between issue-by-issue decision making and compromises. These may be seen as responses to the problem of pluralism. The comparisons show that the social choice framework may be helpful in analysing the traditional problems of political philosophy.

Keywords: Social Choice; Majority Rule; Proportional Representation; Direct Democracy; Deliberative Democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-23261-4_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-23261-4_6

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