No-Envy

Youngsub Chun

Chapter Chapter 5 in Fair Queueing, 2016, pp 47-59 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We explore the implications of no-envy (Foley, Yale Econ Essays 7:45–98, 1967) in the context of queueing problems. First, it is not difficult to show that no-envy implies queue-efficiency. Then, we identify an easy way of checking whether a rule satisfies no-envy. The existence of such a rule can easily be established. We also ask whether there is a rule satisfying efficiency and no-envy together with either one of two cost monotonicity axioms, negative cost monotonicity and positive cost monotonicity. However, there is no rule satisfying efficiency, no-envy, and either one of two cost monotonicity axioms. To remedy the situation, we propose modifications of no-envy, adjusted no-envy, and backward/forward no-envy. Finally, we discuss whether three fairness requirements, no-envy, the identical preferences lower bound, and egalitarian equivalence, are compatible in this context.

Keywords: Egalitarian Equivalence; Cost Monotonicity; Efficient Queue; Fairness Requirements; Reference Bundle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-33771-5_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-33771-5_5

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