Strategyproofness

Youngsub Chun

Chapter Chapter 6 in Fair Queueing, 2016, pp 61-78 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Strategyproofness requires that an agent should not have an incentive to misrepresent her waiting cost no matter what she believes other agents to be doing. We investigate its implications in the context of queueing problems. We begin with the classic result of Holmström (Econometrica 47:1137–1144, 1979) which implies in our context that a rule satisfies queue-efficiency and strategyproofness if and only if it is a VCG rule. By additionally imposing equal treatment of equals, we characterize the complete family of anonymous VCG rules. The symmetrically balanced VCG rule is the only member of this family satisfying budget balance. On the other hand, by imposing independence axioms, the pivotal and the reward-based pivotal rules (Mitra and Mutuswami, Games Econ Behav 72:242–254, 2011) can be characterized. We also characterize the class of k-pivotal rules by generalizing the independence axioms.

Keywords: Strategyproofness; Efficient Queue; Pivot Rule; Mutuswami; Weak Budget Balance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-33771-5_6

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