A Noncooperative Approach

Youngsub Chun

Chapter Chapter 9 in Fair Queueing, 2016, pp 115-139 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We investigate a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they firstly compete with each other for a specific position in the queue. The winner can decide to take up the position or sell it to the others. In the former case, the rest of the players proceed to compete for the remaining positions in the same manner, whereas in the latter case, the seller proposes a queue with corresponding payments to the others which can be accepted or rejected. Depending on which position players are going to compete for, the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the corresponding mechanism coincides with the payoff vector assigned by either the maximal transfer rule or the minimal transfer rule, while an efficient queue is always formed in equilibrium.

Keywords: Efficient Queue; Transfer Rules; Unique SPE Outcome; Queueing Game; Shapley Value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-33771-5_9

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-33771-5_9

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