Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk

Peter Hammond

A chapter in Rational Choice and Social Welfare, 2008, pp 215-233 from Springer

Abstract: Following Zermelo’s (1912) pioneering analysis of chess and similar games, von Neumann (1928) devised a standard paradigm, according to which multiperson decision problems in modern economic analysis and other social science are nearly always modeled as noncooperative games in strategic form. This paradigm relies on two key assumptions, of which the first can be stated as follows: Assumption 1. A multiperson decision problem is fully described by a game in extensive form, whose structure is commonly known to all players in the game.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Mixed Strategy; Extensive Form; Cheap Talk; Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk (2008)
Working Paper: Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk (2008)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79832-3_12

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