Monotonicity and Solidarity Axioms in Economics and Game Theory

Yves Sprumont ()

A chapter in Rational Choice and Social Welfare, 2008, pp 71-94 from Springer

Abstract: An important aspect of the complex notion of fairness in collective choices is that agents should bear responsibility only for their own actions. As a corollary, they should be treated ‘similarly’ when a change occurs for which no one is responsible. A minimal condition of ‘similar’ treatment is certainly that nobody benefits from such a change if someone else suffers from it.

Keywords: Cooperative Game; Payoff Vector; Preference Domain; Fair Division; Convex Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-540-79832-3_5

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783540798323

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79832-3_5

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Studies in Choice and Welfare from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().