Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting

Jean-François Laslier

Chapter Chapter 14 in Handbook on Approval Voting, 2010, pp 339-356 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter reviews the experimental work about Approval Voting which follows the now standard practice of Experimental Economics. The principle of Experimental Economics is to observe individual behavior in situations where the experimenter can control individual preferences. The classical way to induce and control preferences is to use money, that is to pay the subjects more or less, depending on what they do and, in group experiments, what the other subjects do. This methodology has slowly gained popularity among the economists and is summarized in several classical references (for instance Davis and Holt 1993; Kagel and Roth 1995).

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Social Choice; Vote Rule; Condorcet Winner; American Political Science Review (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_14

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