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Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections

Arnaud Dellis ()

Chapter Chapter 18 in Handbook on Approval Voting, 2010, pp 431-451 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Approval Voting is a voting procedure in which a voter can vote for as many candidates as she wishes, and the candidate who receives the most votes wins the election. Since the seminal contribution of Brams and Fishburn (1978), Approval Voting has received considerable attention. Of course, Approval Voting has been the subject of numerous scholarly papers, as this handbook testifies. But Approval Voting has also received considerable attention outside academics. This is best exemplified by the fact that there are now several professional associations that elect their officers by means of Approval Voting.1 Also, the use of Approval Voting in political elections has been advocated relentlessly and, at one point, was even hailed as the electoral reform of the twentieth century (Brams 1980, p. 105).

Keywords: Vote Behavior; Vote Strategy; Strategic Vote; Approval Vote; Vote Procedure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-02839-7_18

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_18

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