Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections

D. Marc Kilgour ()
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D. Marc Kilgour: Wilfrid Laurier University

Chapter Chapter 6 in Handbook on Approval Voting, 2010, pp 105-124 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Approval voting is a well-known voting procedure for single-winner elections. Voters approve of as many candidates as they like, and the candidate with the most approvals wins (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 1983, 2005). But Merrill and Nagel (1987) point out that there are many ways to aggregate approval votes to determine a winner, justifying a distinction between approval balloting, in which each voter submits a ballot that identifies the candidates the voter approves of, and approval voting, the procedure of ranking the candidates according to their total numbers of approvals.

Keywords: American Political Science Review; Approval Vote; Approval Procedure; Count Weight; Satisfaction Procedure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_6

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