Optimal Redistribution in the Distributive Liberal Social Contract

Jean Mercier Ythier ()
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Jean Mercier Ythier: Université Panthéon-Assas, ERMES, and IDEP

A chapter in Social Ethics and Normative Economics, 2011, pp 303-325 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The liberal social contract introduced in Kolm (1985, 1987a,b) and further developed in Kolm (1996, Chap. 5) and Kolm (2004, Chap. 3) is a normative construct corresponding to the unanimous agreement of individuals derived from the sole consideration of their preferences and rights, while abstracting from all conceivable impediments to the achievement of this agreement or implementation of its contents. These impediments are, notably, informational and other obstacles to the elaboration of the clauses of the social contract, and difficulties with their enforcement.

Keywords: Social Contract; Market Equilibrium; Distributive Optimum; Equilibrium Allocation; Distributive Utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-17807-8_13

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-17807-8_13

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