Reciprocity and Norms

Jon Elster ()
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Jon Elster: Collège de France

A chapter in Social Ethics and Normative Economics, 2011, pp 327-337 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract For over a quarter of a century or more, Serge Kolm (see Kolm 1984, 2006, 2008) has made a number of contributions to the study of reciprocity. This article is intended to supplement his writings by addressing a topic that Kolm discusses mostly (but frequently) in passing: the relation between reciprocity and norms. I shall also consider the relation between Kolm’s work and the recent work by Ernst Fehr and his collaborators. The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, I consider the structure of two-party reciprocity, and in Sect. 3 the relation between norms and reciprocity.

Keywords: Social Norm; Loss Aversion; Moral Norm; Free Rider; Public Good Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-17807-8_14

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