Partnership, Solidarity, and Minimal Envy in Matching Problems

Koichi Tadenuma ()
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Koichi Tadenuma: Hitotsubashi University

A chapter in Social Ethics and Normative Economics, 2011, pp 155-167 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Consider a firm that has several factories. The firm must assign workers to these factories. Each factorymanager has preferences over the workers, while each worker has preferences over which factory he works at. What is a desirable rule to match workers to factories?

Keywords: Selection Rule; Stable Matchings; Impossibility Result; Matching Rule; Indivisible Good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-17807-8_6

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