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Borrowing-Proofness of the Lindahl Rule in Kolm Triangle Economies

William Thomson ()
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William Thomson: University of Rochester

A chapter in Social Ethics and Normative Economics, 2011, pp 169-191 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Allocation rules can be manipulated in a variety of ways. Agents may misrepresent their preferences, a possibility that has been extensively studied. They can also take advantage of the control they have over resources, and different kinds of stratagems of this type have been identified. For instance, in a classical exchange economy in which resources are allocated by means of the Walrasian rule, an agent may benefit from withholding some of his endowment. He may even benefit from destroying some of it. Also, he may benefit from transferring some of his endowment to someone else (of course without this second agent being hurt, thereby having no reason not to accept the transfer). For a discussion of these phenomena, see Gale (1974), Aumann and Peleg (1974), Postlewaite (1979), and Thomson (1987a,b). Additional manipulation opportunities are discussed in Thomson (2007).

Keywords: Public Good; Private Good; Indifference Curve; Classical Domain; Indivisible Good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-17807-8_7

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-17807-8_7

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