Which Voting Rule Minimizes the Probability of the Referendum Paradox? Lessons from French Data

Rahhal Lahrach () and Vincent Merlin ()
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Rahhal Lahrach: Mohammed First University-EST Oujda, Université Mohammed Premier
Vincent Merlin: CREM, Université de Caen Basse Normandie and CNRS

Chapter Chapter 5 in Electoral Systems, 2012, pp 129-150 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Amajor goal of democracy is to achieve equal representation of the citizens. Though equal representation can be easily achieved when all the voters directly select a president or decide on a policy through a referendum, the issue is not that simple for indirect democracy. A crucial question thus relates to the choice of the “best” two-tier voting rules. More precisely, how many mandates should be allocated to each jurisdiction (examples being electoral constituencies, local jurisdictions, regions, states, countries) in this type of system? Which quota should be used for decision? Very different answers to these questions were adopted by the various federal structures.

Keywords: Ordinary Little Square; Social Choice; Vote Rule; Independence Assumption; Total Utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8_5

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