Modeling the Outcomes of Vote-Casting in Actual Elections

T. Nicolaus Tideman and Florenz Plassmann ()
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T. Nicolaus Tideman: Virginia Tech
Florenz Plassmann: Binghamton University

Chapter Chapter 9 in Electoral Systems, 2012, pp 217-251 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract How often do events of interest to voting theorists occur in actual elections? For example, what is the probability of observing a voting cycle – an outcome in which no candidate beats all other candidates in pairwise comparison by majority rule? When there is a candidate who beats all others in such pairwise comparisons – a Condorcet winner – what is the probability that a voting method chooses this candidate?What is the probability that voters have an incentive to vote strategically – that is, cast their votes in ways that do not reflect their true preferences? Voting theorists have analyzed these questions in great detail, using a variety of statistical models that describe different distributions of candidate rankings.

Keywords: Actual Election; Spatial Model; Multinomial Distribution; Vote Share; Condorcet Winner (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8_9

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