Probabilities of Unequal Choices by Vote and by Candidate Scores

Andranik Tangian
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Andranik Tangian: WSI Hans-Böckler-Foundation

Chapter Appendix B in Mathematical Theory of Democracy, 2014, pp 537-545 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The following tables contain probabilities of unequal rankings of two candidates obtained by two methods: by majority voting and by the candidates’ total numerical scores assigned by the voters.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-38724-1_16

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