Minimal Maskin Monotonic Extensions of Tournament Solutions

İpek Özkal-Sanver (), Pelin Pasin () and Remzi Sanver
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İpek Özkal-Sanver: İstanbul Bilgi University
Pelin Pasin: İzmir Katip Çelebi University

A chapter in Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare, 2015, pp 127-141 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we give a general characterization of the minimal Maskin monotonic extensions of Condorcet consistent tournament solutions. We then compute the minimal Maskin monotonic extensions for the following rules: The top-cycle, the uncovered set, the iterated uncovered set, the minimal covering set and the Copeland rule. Moreover, we characterize the minimal Maskin monotonic extensions of the social choice rules that are generated by the top-cycle, the uncovered set, the iterated uncovered set, and the minimal covering set via the majority rule. We also give results establishing the relation between the minimal Maskin monotonic extensions in the tournament environment and the social choice environment.

Keywords: Condorcet consistency; Minimal Maskin monotoic extensions; Tournament solutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-46439-7_8

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