Winners and Losers from Price-Level Volatility: Money Taxation and Information Frictions
Aditya Goenka (),
Minwook Kang and
Karl Shell ()
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Guido Cozzi: University of St.Gallen
Minwook Kang: Nanyang Technological University
Chapter Chapter 16 in Sunspots and Non-Linear Dynamics, 2017, pp 387-402 from Springer
Abstract We analyze an economy with taxes and transfers denominated in dollars and an information friction. It is the information friction that allows for volatility in equilibrium prices and allocations. When the price level is expected to be stable, the competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal. When the price level is volatile, it is not Pareto optimal, but the stable equilibrium allocations do not necessarily dominate the volatile ones. There can be winners and losers from volatility. We identify winners and losers and describe the effect on them of increases in volatility. Our analysis is an application of the weak axiom of revealed preference in the tax-adjusted Edgeworth box.
Keywords: Price Level; Expected Utility; Security Market; Spot Market; Equilibrium Allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-319-44076-7_16
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